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I. FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSES OF SECTION 403
1. Section 403 evolved from legislation limiting profit to a statutory 
percentage.—The first law since World War I relative to a control of 
profits on armament was the Vinson-Trammell Act, enacted in 1934. 
Under this law profits on naval construction contracts for vessels and 
aircraft were limited to 10 percent of the contract price. In June of 
1936 the act was amended to permit the offsetting of losses on one 
contract against profits on another by extending the 10 percent profit 
limitation to aggregate contract prices for all contracts completed 
during each taxable year. In addition, the amendment permitted the 
offsetting of net losses of one taxable year against net profits of the 
succeeding taxable year. In the same year (1936) the Merchant 
Marine Act provided for a 10 percent limitation on profits on con­
tracts for ships built for the Maritime Commission. In April of 1939 
the Vinson-Trammell Act was amended to provide that the 10 per­
cent limitation on profits be applied only to contracts for naval vessels 
and that on contracts for Army and Navy aircraft a maximum profit 
of 12 percent of contract price be allowed. All of these enactments 
related to peacetime procurement, since the country was not yet pre­
paring for war.
In the next year, on June 28, 1940 an act was passed changing the 
allowable profits on naval vessels and Army and Navy aircraft to 8 
percent of the contract price. This act, coming as it did after the fall 
of the Low Countries and France, is really the beginning of war profit 
legislation in the United States. This act extended to subcontractors 
the provisions of the Vinson-Trammell Act and reduced the profit 
limitations imposed thereby to 8 percent of contract prices or 8.7 
percent of allowable costs of contracts other than prime contracts 
made on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis. The Second Revenue Act of 1940, 
approved October 8, 1940, suspended as of December 31, 1939, the 
profit limitation statutes applicable to military and naval contracts 
and subcontracts whenever the contractors and subcontractors were 
subject to excess profits tax. Pursuant to the Second War Powers 
Act, approved March 27, 1941, the President by Executive Order 
9217, issued April 10, 1942, designated the War Production Board, 
the War Department, the Navy Department, the Treasury Depart­
ment, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Maritime 
Commission as the governmental agencies authorized to inspect the 
plants and audit the books and records of any contractor or subcon­
tractor with whom a defense contract had been placed, to prevent the 
accumulation of unreasonable profits.
Under this authority the War Department, the Navy Department 
and the Maritime Commission, on April 25, 1942, directed the estab­
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lishment of cost analysis sections and price adjustment boards. The 
cost analysis sections were to conduct surveys of costs and profits in­
cident to war contracts, and to act as fact finding agencies for the 
price adjustment boards. The boards were to assist the Departments 
and the Commission in securing voluntary adjustments or refunds 
whenever costs or profits were deemed excessive.
On March 28, 1942, however, the day after the Second War Powers 
Act became law, and nearly 2 weeks before Executive Order 9127 was 
issued, the House of Representatives adopted the Case Amendment 
to H. R. 6868 (Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation 
Act, 1942), the purpose of which was to limit the profits on any war 
contract to 6 percent, thereby precipitating the whole question of 
additional controls over war profits.
2. Section 403 was adopted as an alternative to fixed profit legislation. 
—The War and Navy Departments are opposed to uniform flat per­
centage profit legislation on the theory that this virtually places con­
tracts on a cost-plus basis and because it is felt that the rate of profit 
should be related to the contribution and performance of the con­
tractor and not to a fixed statutory percentage. A flat profit control 
limitation, in the opinion of these Departments, does not achieve its 
primary objective of uniformity of treatment. Although it allows a 
fixed uniform percent of profit on gross sales, this is most unfair as 
applied to the different types of business engaged in war work. It 
does not recognize the fact that in different lines of business the same 
volume of sales may require widely different amounts of capital, skill, 
and work, depending on the rate of turn-over or production, the 
nature of the article or services, and similar factors. Moreover, some 
contractors will be using Government facilities, some will be Govern­
ment financed either through advance payments, direct loans, or cost- 
plus-fixed-fee contracts, while others will be using their own facilities 
and capital.
Many vital war items have required for their production the appli­
cation over a period of years of highly developed inventive genius, 
original designing and mechanical skill. Also, many products require 
such precision in manufacture that few contractors can qualify for 
their production. Furthermore, it not infrequently happens that the 
contractor who develops such an article is producing it in his own 
plant with his own capital and with his own painstakingly developed 
machinery. Another contractor may be engaged as a new and sepa­
rate source of supply, and may receive new plant, machinery and 
equipment, without cost, from the Government; the “know how” and 
patent licenses may have been obtained without cost from the origi­
nal contractor. As a result of these contributions and modern equip­
ment, the second contractor frequently produces the article at a lower 
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cost than the original contractor. It is obvious that the second con­
tractor is not entitled to the same rate of profit as the original one.
On the other hand, in some cases the costs of a new producer have 
been twice that of the original contractor because of a lack of skill 
and “know how.” Under fixed statutory limitations the new con­
tractor might receive twice the profit of the original producer. This 
is obviously most unfair. Consideration must also be given to the 
situation where a “run of the mill product,” requiring little skill, is 
being manufactured and where material costs are relatively large; 
and also to cases where subassembling is performed by a subcon­
tractor.
It is apparent, from these examples, that a uniform maximum rate 
of profit for everyone would necessarily be unfair to many. Further­
more, industry studies have revealed diversities in production so 
varied that, with rare exceptions, even application of a uniform rate 
to broad classifications by industries would not be practical or equi­
table. Renegotiation appears to be the only method so far suggested 
which is sufficiently flexible to cope with the diversity between indus­
tries or the variations within them.
The War and Navy Departments, therefore, suggested the elimina­
tion of the Case amendment and, at the request of the Chairman of 
the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations, representatives of the 
War and Navy Departments and Mr. Donald M. Nelson, Chairman 
of the War Production Board, agreed to suggest a substitute method 
of preventing excessive or unanticipated profits on war contracts. 
The substitute method recommended by the War and Navy Depart­
ments and Mr. Nelson was not adopted by Congress, but the Case 
Amendment was eliminated and section 403 was enacted in its place. 
Section 403 was based upon the theory that the contract prices of 
each contractor might be adjusted after consideration of experience 
in the performance thereof and after negotiation with the contractor. 
Section 403 was amended by section 801 of the Revenue Act of 1942, 
approved October 21, 1942, to meet certain administrative problems 
encountered in its application, but its basic principles were not 
changed. It is true that the very flexibility of renegotiation makes 
complete uniformity and certainty almost impossible and the neces­
sity of dealing with cases individually creates a serious administrative 
burden. Nevertheless, it is felt that the benefits and advantages of 
renegotiation outweigh these disadvantages and make it preferable 
to other methods proposed.
3. Section 403 is not a tax act designed to raise revenue, but is a price 
adjustment act designed to lower costs.—Section 403 has been occasion­
ally but inaccurately interpreted as a tax act. The problem of exces­
sive war costs and profits is primarily a problem of pricing and not of 
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taxation. Heavy taxation does not meet the problem but tends to 
aggravate it by creating an incentive for increasing costs.
Three important respects in which taxation is ineffective in meet­
ing the problems solved by renegotiation are:
First—War materiel contracts, which have been generally profit­
able, sometimes are excessively so because many war industries have 
had to be created under forced draft. In many cases profits have been 
unpredictable because the production of repetitive items has in­
creased by geometric proportions. Therefore, the accumulation of 
excessive profits by some war contractors has been and always will be 
unavoidable. These excessive profits are extremely irregular. They 
accrue to some contractors, not to others. Taxation, which must 
apply equally to all war and civilian businesses, cannot keep pace with 
this erratic development of excessive war profits.
Second—War industries lack the normal competitive incentive for 
low-cost, efficient operation. The Government, in many instances 
must buy from every available source of supply, regardless of cost. 
Neither taxation nor any proposed profit limitation formula restores 
this incentive. In fact, taxation and most limitation formulas put a 
premium on high costs.
Third—The munitions industry is extremely varied. A large part 
of it operates with Government capital or Government guarantees, 
substantially reducing private risks. Some contractors can continue 
their peacetime processes with little change. Others must attempt 
unfamiliar and unexplored operations. Some operations permit a 
very rapid turn-over of the contractor’s investment, others a very 
slow turn-over. No formula for limiting profits can deal equitably 
with all these circumstances.
Renegotiation of contracts can do what taxation and flat formulas 
cannot. It can fit the profit to the facts. It can reduce excessive 
profits, leaving reasonable profits untouched. It can reward low-cost 
efficiency. It can distinguish between degrees of risk and venture. It 
is the only device flexible enough to fit the variety of war industries.
As section 403 is designed to meet this pricing problem, the exacti­
tude and uniformity of application found under a tax act cannot be 
expected. An equal degree of uniformity might be expected in the 
renegotiation of groups of contracts after “the facts are in” as would 
have been reached at the time of initial negotiations had all the facts 
then been known. The degree of uniformity under the original nego­
tiations would be varied, however, by the extent to which various fac­
tors might be given different weighting by different persons or groups. 
Consequently, the results of renegotiation will not and can not reach 
the mathematical uniformity resulting from a tax statute that is con­
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cerned only with the determination of the amount of net income 
based upon a stated formula.
4. Specified purposes of and remedies under section 403—Subsection 
(b) of section 403 requires the insertion in contracts for an amount 
in excess of $100,000 made after April 28, 1942, of a provision requir­
ing renegotiation of the contract price at a period or periods when, 
in the judgment of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, 
the Secretary of the Treasury, or the Chairman of the Maritime Com­
mission, the profits can be determined with reasonable certainty, as 
well as a provision requiring the contractor to insert a similar pro­
vision in each subcontract for an amount in excess of $100,000 made 
by him under such contract.
Subsection (c) of section 403 authorizes and directs the Secretary 
of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and 
the Chairman of the Maritime Commission, whenever in his opinion 
excessive profits have been realized, or are likely to be realized, from 
any contract with his Department or the Commission, as the case may 
be, or from any subcontract thereunder, whether or not made by the 
contractor, to require the contractor or subcontractor to renegotiate 
the contract price of any existing contract or subcontract, even though 
made prior to April 28, 1942 (provided final payment had not been 
made prior to that date), and of any contract or subcontract made 
thereafter, whether or not it contains a renegotiation or recapture 
clause, unless such contract or subcontract provides otherwise or is 
exempted pursuant to other provisions of the statute.
The statute defines renegotiation as including a refixing of the con­
tract price by the Secretary or the Chairman. This refixing is gener­
ally accomplished by mutual agreement arrived at by negotiation be­
tween the contractor and the price adjustment board of one of the 
Departments or the Commission. Under these agreements, excessive 
profits are eliminated in various ways, among which are the follow­
ing: (1) A direct cash refund by the prime contractor to the Govern­
ment, in which event his contract prices would not be adjusted for 
the period covered; (2) a reduction in the contract prices on future 
deliveries under prime contracts, which automatically would accrue 
to the benefit of the Government; (3) a direct cash refund by the 
subcontractor to the Government; and (4) a reduction in the contract 
price on future deliveries under subcontracts, with a provision that 
any prime contractor receiving the benefit thereof must pass on an 
equivalent benefit to the Government in the form of a corresponding 
reduction in the contract prices of its prime contracts or a direct cash 
refund to the Government. These methods may also be used in com­
bination and are not exclusive of other appropriate and effective 
methods applicable to particular situations.
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In the event it becomes impossible to reach a mutual agreement, 
the case is then referred to the official of the Department or the Com­
mission to whom authority has been delegated under the statute, 
who gives consideration to the use of such special measures as he may 
deem necessary or advisable.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOLLOWED AND FACTORS 
CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF 
EXCESSIVE PROFITS
In the present emergency the existence of excessive profits does not 
necessarily indicate that a contractor has taken undue advantage of 
the Government or that the contracting officers have failed to exer­
cise good judgment under all the circumstances. Companies have 
been asked to produce war equipment with which neither they nor 
others have had any previous experience, and in quantities far be­
yond anything previously contemplated. Under such circumstances 
the estimates of costs have necessarily been unreliable and when sub­
jected to the test of actual production have often proved to be sub­
stantially higher than the actual costs. Consequently, many con­
tractors have been left with profits which they neither anticipated 
nor wish to retain. The true purpose of renegotiation is to determine, 
preferably by agreement, the amount of these profits which exceed a 
fair margin under all the circumstances, and these circumstances are 
bound to vary in individual cases.
1. General principles followed in determining excessive profits.—In 
considering whether costs or profits on war contracts are excessive, 
the price adjustment boards are guided by the following broad 
principles:
(a) That the stimulation of quantity production is of primary 
importance.
(b) That reasonable profits in every case should be determined 
with reference to the particular performance factors present with­
out limitation or restriction by any fixed formula with respect to 
rate of profit, or otherwise.
(c) That the profits of the contractor ordinarily will be deter­
mined on his war business as a whole for a fiscal period, rather than 
on specific contracts separately, with the possible exception of cer­
tain construction contracts. Fixed price contracts are negotiated 
separately from fees on cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts.
(d) That as volume increases the margin of profit should de­
crease. This is particularly true in those cases where the amount 
of business done is abnormally large in relation to the amount of 
the contractor’s own capital and company-owned plant, and where 
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such production is made possible only by capital and plant fur­
nished by the Government.
(e) That in determining what margin of profit is fair, consider­
ation should be given to the corresponding profits in pre-war base 
years of the particular contractor and for the industry, especially 
in cases where the war products are substantially like pre-war prod­
ucts. It should not be assumed, however, that under war conditions 
a contractor is entitled to as great a margin of profit as that obtained 
under competitive conditions in normal times.
(f) That the reasonableness of profits should be determined be­
fore provision for Federal income and excess profits taxes.
(g) That a contractor’s right to a reasonable profit and his need 
for working capital should be distinguished. A contractor should 
not be allowed to earn excessive profits on war contracts merely be­
cause he lacks adequate working capital in relation to a greatly 
increased volume of business.
2. Particular factors considered when applicable in determining exces­
sive profits.—In determining the margin of profit to which a contractor 
is entitled, consideration is given to the manner in which the con­
tractor’s operations compare with those of other contractors with re­
spect to the applicable factors; among such factors taken into con­
sideration, when applicable, are the following:
(a) Price reductions and comparative prices.
(b) Efficiency in reducing costs.
(c) Economy in the use of raw materials.
(d) Efficiency in the use of facilities and in the conservation of 
manpower.
(e) Character and extent of subcontracting.
(f) Quality of production.
(g) Complexity of manufacturing technique.
(h) Rate of delivery and turnover.
(i) Inventive and developmental contribution with respect to 
important war products.
(/) Cooperation with the Government and with other contrac­
tors in developing and supplying technical assistance to alternative 
or competitive sources of supply and the effect thereof on the con­
tractor’s future peacetime business.
Consideration is also given to possible increases in cost of mate­
rials, imminent wage increases, and the risks assumed by a contractor 
such as inexperience in new types of production, delays from inabil­
ity to obtain materials, rejections, spoilage, “cut-backs” in quantities, 
and guarantees of quality and performance of the product. It is also 
recognized that a contractor whose pricing policy results in com­
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paratively reasonable profits is entitled to more favorable treatment 
than a contractor whose pricing policy results in a large amount of 
unreasonable profits unless this is attributable to reduced costs rather 
than over-pricing. The contractor who maintains only a reasonable 
margin of profit is subjected to the risks incident to the performance 
of a fixed price contract, while the contractor who practices over­
pricing usually has taken few, if any, of such risks. In the latter case 
the profit of the contractor should be adjusted in the direction of the 
fee that might have been allowed under a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract 
for the production of similar articles.
The contractor in every instance is given ample opportunity to de­
velop and present facts with respect to all of the above factors and to 
any other factors which in his particular case may be relevant to the 
contractor’s over all quality of performance, upon which his profit 
reward is based.
III. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE STATUTE
The following interpretations of the statute represent the present 
opinion of the Departments and the Commission and are subject to 
such revision from time to time as may appear desirable as a result of 
the operation of the boards under these interpretations. They are 
issued for information only and are subject to change without notice. 
To facilitate the issuance of changes, these interpretations are desig­
nated J-PAB-1 to J-PAB-12, inclusive.
J-PAB-1
1. Contracts and subcontracts subject to renegotiation.—Under sub­
section (c) of section 403 of the Sixth Supplemental National Defense 
Appropriation Act, 1942 (Public, No. 528, 77th Cong.), approved 
April 28, 1942, as amended by section 801 of the Revenue Act of 1942 
(Public, No. 753, 77th Cong.), approved October 21, 1942, whenever 
in the opinion of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the 
Secretary of the Treasury, or the Chairman of the Maritime Com­
mission (each being hereinafter referred to as the “Secretary”), the 
profits realized or likely to be realized on any contract or contracts 
with such Department or Commission (each being hereinafter re­
ferred to as the “Department”), or from any subcontract or subcon­
tracts thereunder whether or not made by the contractor, may be ex­
cessive, the Secretary is authorized and directed to require the con­
tractor or subcontractor to renegotiate the prices of such contracts 
and subcontracts to eliminate any excessive profits thereunder.
The provisions of section 403 relate to all contracts entered into by 
the War and Navy Departments and the Maritime Commission. Con­
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tracts of the Treasury Department subject to renegotiation include 
(1) Contracts placed under section 201 of title II of the First War 
Powers Act, 1941, 55 Stat. 839 (principally lend-lease contracts, 
which may be identified by the symbols “DA-TPS” preceding the 
contract number);
(2) Contracts for strategic and critical materials placed under the 
authority of the Act of June 7, 1939, 53 Stat. 811 (such contracts 
made after March 1, 1943 may be identified by the symbols “SCM- 
TPS” preceding the contract number);
(3) Contracts for supplies for refugee relief under the Red Cross 
program, placed under the authority contained under title III of the 
Third Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942, 55 
Stat. 817 (such contracts may be identified by the symbols “RR-TPS” 
preceding the contract number).
Other types of contracts regularly entered into by the Procurement 
Division of the Treasury Department in the ordinary course of busi­
ness prior to the war period, as such, are not subject to renegotiation 
unless negotiated under authority contained in title II of the First 
War Powers Act, 1941. However, purchase orders, issued by the War 
and Navy Departments and the Maritime Commission under General 
Schedule of Supplies Contracts, which are entered into by the Pro­
curement Division of the Treasury Department on behalf of all de­
partments and establishments of the Government, are considered as 
being subject to the provisions of section 403. Purchase orders issued 
by the Treasury Department itself under such contracts are also con­
sidered as being subject to the provisions of section 403 if such pur­
chases are for lend-lease or for the Red Cross program.
All so-called lend-lease contracts entered into by the War Depart­
ment, the Navy Department, the Treasury Department and the Mari­
time Commission are subject to the provisions of section 403. How­
ever, lend-lease contracts entered into by any other department or 
agency of the Government are not subject to renegotiation under 
existing law.
Subsection (c) of section 403 is applicable to all such contracts and 
subcontracts, whether or not such contracts or subcontracts contain 
a renegotiation clause, unless (i) final payment pursuant to such con­
tract or subcontract was made prior to April 28, 1942, or (ii) the con­
tract or subcontract provides otherwise pursuant to subsection (b) or 
(i), or is exempted under subsection (i), of section 403, or (iii) the 
aggregate sales by the contractor or subcontractor, and by all persons 
under the control of or controlling or under common control with 
the contractor or subcontractor, under contracts with the Depart­
ments and subcontracts thereunder do not exceed, or in the opinion 
of the Secretary concerned will not exceed, $100,000 for the fiscal 
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year of such contractor or subcontractor; provided, however, no re­
negotiation of the contract price pursuant to any provision therefor, 
or otherwise, shall be commenced more than one year after the close 
of the fiscal year of the contractor or subcontractor within which com­
pletion or termination of the contract or subcontract occurs.
The term “subcontract” as used in subsection (c) is defined to 
mean any purchase order or agreement to perform all or any part of 
the work, or to make or furnish any article, required for the perform­
ance of another contract or subcontract. The term “article” is defined 
to include any material, part, assembly, machinery, equipment, or 
other personal property. This definition of “subcontract” is much 
broader than under the Vinson-Trammell Act, in that profits on the 
production and sale of articles required for the performance of an­
other contract or subcontract are subject to renegotiation, as well as 
profits on the production or sale of all materials incorporated into 
the end product, down to and including raw materials, except in the 
case of certain specified raw materials exempted under subsection (i) 
(1) (ii) of the statute. This definition is interpreted to include con­
tracts with contractors and subcontractors (a) for the sale of an end 
product or an article incorporated therein, (b) for the sale of ma­
chinery or equipment used in the processing of an end product or of 
an article incorporated in an end product, (c) for the sale of com­
ponent parts of or subassemblies for such machinery or equipment, 
and (d) for the performance of personal services required for the per­
formance of the contracts and subcontracts included in (a), (b) and (c).
An allocation is made of sales of such machinery and equipment 
based on the nature of the use thereof (i. e., war or commercial pro­
duction) and to the extent to which the production of the purchasers 
to whom such sales are made is subject to renegotiation, such sales 
are considered renegotiable. Thus if 60 percent of the sales of the 
purchasers to whom such machinery and equipment are sold is re- 
negotiable, such sales of machinery and equipment are considered 
renegotiable to the same extent. In those cases where it is unduly 
burdensome or impractical to trace the end use of individual items 
of machinery or equipment, the Departments frequently make this 
determination on the basis of industry-wide estimates or by some 
other method mutually agreed upon.
The term “article” has also been interpreted to include commer­
cial products as well as equipment fabricated for particular uses or 
purposes. The fact that commercial products are sold for industrial 
uses, either directly or through jobbers or other commercial channels, 
does not exclude such articles from this definition. The same tests 
are applied to both ordinary commercial products and equipment 
fabricated for special uses and purposes.
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The fact that all or part of such articles are sold under price ceil­
ings fixed by the Office of Price Administration does not exclude such 
articles from this definition, or exempt profits made on the sale 
thereof from renegotiation.
J-PAB-2 (a)
2. Exemptions.—2 (a) Payment before April 28, 1942.— Contracts 
and subcontracts are not subject to renegotiation under the statute 
if final payment pursuant to such contract or subcontract was made 
prior to April 28, 1942. If final payment on a contract or subcontract 
was not made prior to April 28, 1942, profits made thereunder at any 
time, even in years prior to 1942, are subject to renegotiation. The 
Departments have adopted the policy that this provision with respect 
to payment before April 28, 1942 will be interpreted so that payment 
will be deemed to have been made although certain relatively small 
unliquidated items may not have been finally determined and paid 
for.
This exemption raises the legal question of when a series of trans­
actions constitute one contract or several contracts. If the transac­
tions constitute one contract and final payment had not been made 
before April 28, 1942, then all the transactions thereunder are subject 
to renegotiation. If, however, the transactions constitute several con­
tracts, then only those contracts on which final payment had been 
made before April 28, 1942, are exempt. This question arises fre­
quently in cases involving reorders and orders under option agree­
ments, periodic deliveries under purchase orders, and other similar 
circumstances. In determining whether an order for further quan­
tities or work constitutes a new and separate contract, the test is 
whether a new or additional promise is given by the contractor with 
respect to the additional order, or whether this additional quantity 
or work is covered by an option, or otherwise, under the initial 
contract.
J-PAB-2 (b) (i)
2. (b) (i) Fixed exemptions: Contracts with other governmental 
agencies; Defense Plant Corporation.—Subsection (i) (1) (i) of the 
statute provides that the statute shall not apply to any contract by a 
Department with any other department, bureau, agency or govern­
mental corporation of the United States or with any Territory, pos­
session, or State or any agency thereof or with any foreign government 
or any agency thereof. Contracts between such agencies or govern­
mental corporations and private contractors, and subcontracts there­
under, are likewise not subject to renegotiation, except in those in­
stances where the agency or governmental corporation is acting as a 
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direct agent for a Department. In these instances, the contract is 
deemed to be with the principal for whom the agency or govern­
mental corporation is acting as direct agent, and not with the agency 
or governmental corporation, and accordingly, if otherwise subject 
to renegotiation, will not be exempted. Thus, contracts with Defense 
Supplies Corporation, Metals Reserve Company, Rubber Reserve 
Company, and similar governmental corporations are not subject to 
renegotiation unless it appears that the governmental corporation 
was acting as the direct agent for one of the Departments.
As to contracts with the Defense Plant Corporation, the following 
statement of policy has been approved by the Under Secretary of 
War and the Under Secretary of the Navy:
With respect to contracts placed by Defense Plant Corporation 
for machine tools and other equipment and personal property to 
be included in leased facilities to prime contractors with or sub­
contractors of the War and the Navy Departments, the War and 
the Navy Departments will obtain appropriate information as to 
sales, costs, and profits on such contracts and will include such con­
tracts in the renegotiation wherever possible. If the contractors 
object to such renegotiation and the information indicates the pos­
sibility of excessive profits, the information will be transmitted to 
Defense Plant Corporation which will examine the information 
with a view to renegotiation in consultation with the War or Navy 
Departments. Contracts placed by Defense Plant Corporation for 
the construction of plants, as distinguished from the furnishing of 
equipment and supplies, will not be renegotiated nor will contrac­
tors be required to furnish information as to their profits on those 
contracts.
It frequently happens that manufacturers of machine tools and other 
equipment and personal property for Defense Plant Corporation 
prefer to obtain a clearance from any possible statutory liability for 
excessive profits on those contracts instead of relying solely on the 
view of the Department that such contracts are not subject to rene­
gotiation, and this procedure enables them to do so. The Depart­
ments and Defense Plant Corporation also prefer to have such con­
tracts included in the renegotiation whenever possible because in 
many instances the Department agrees to indemnify the Defense 
Plant Corporation against loss threon.
J-PAB-2 (b) (ii)
2 (b) (ii) Fixed exemptions: Contracts for certain raw materials — 
Subsection (i) (1) (ii) provides that the statute shall not apply to any 
contract or subcontract for the product of a mine, oil or gas well, 
or other mineral or natural deposit, or timber, which has not been 
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processed, refined, or treated beyond the first form or state suitable 
for industrial use; and the Secretaries are authorized by joint regula­
tion to define, interpret, and apply this exemption. Such joint regula­
tion, promulgated as of February 1, 1943, is as follows:
“1. The term ‘exempted product,’ as used in this regulation, 
shall mean any of the following products:
Aggregates consisting of washed or screened sand, gravel or 
crushed stone.
Aluminum ingots and pigs; alumina; calcined or dried 
bauxite; crude bauxite.
Antimony ore, crude; antimony ore, concentrated; antimony 
metal; antimony oxide.




Chromium ore and ferrochrome not processed beyond the 
form or state suitable for use as an alloy or refractory in the 
manufacture of steel; bichromates; chromic acid.
China clay; kaolin clay; fire clay; brick and tile made from 
clays other than kaolin, china or fire clay.
Coal, prepared; run-of-mine coal.
Copper ore, crude; copper ore, concentrated; copper billets, 
cathodes, cakes, ingots, ingot bars, powder, slabs, and wirebars.
Fluorspar ore; fluorspar fluxing gravel; lump ceramic ground 
fluorspar; acid grades of fluorspar.
Crude iron ore; pig iron.
Gas, natural, not processed or treated further than the process­
ing or treating customarily occurring at or near the well.
Gypsum, crude; calcined gypsum.
Lead ore; refined lead bars, ingots and pigs; antimonial lead 
bars, ingots and pigs.
Lime.
Magnesite; dead burned magnesite.
Metallic magnesium, pigs and ingots.
Manganese ore; ferromanganese; silicomanganese.
Oil, crude, not processed or treated further than the process­
ing or treating customarily occurring at or near the well.
Phosphate rock; superphosphate.
Ferromolybdenum; calcium molybdate; molybdenum oxide. 
Rock salt; common salt of all grades.
Refined silver bars, shot, powder and grains.
Stone, rough dimension.
Sulphur, crude.




Tungsten ore and concentrates; ferrotungsten; tungsten 
powder.
Vanadium ore and concentrates; ferrovanadium; vanadium 
pentoxide.
Zinc anodes, balls, oxides, powder and slabs.
“2. Subsection (i) (1) (ii) of section 403 of the Sixth Supple­
mental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942, as amended, is 
interpreted to mean that each of the exempted products is ‘the 
product of a mine, oil or gas well, or other mineral or natural 
deposit, or timber, which has not been processed, refined or treated 
beyond the first form or state suitable for industrial use’. The 
provisions of said section 403, as amended, shall not apply to con­
tracts or subcontracts for the exempted products.
“3. In cases where a contractor or subcontractor (a) processes, 
refines, or treats a product to bring it up to the form or state of an 
exempted product and, (b) further refines, processes or treats such 
exempted product beyond the first form or state suitable for indus­
trial use in order to perform his contract or subcontract, then in 
such cases the exempted product in its first form or state suitable 
for industrial use shall be considered, for the purposes of renegotia­
tion under section 403, as amended, as an item of cost at its 
established sale or market price.
“4. This regulation may be amended from time to time, revis­
ing the list of exempted products contained in paragraph 1 of this 
regulation.”
J-PAB-2 (c)
2 (c) Discretionary exemptions— Under subsection (b) of the 
statute, the Secretary, if in his opinion the provisions of the contract 
or subcontract are otherwise adequate to prevent excessive profits, 
may provide that renegotiation shall apply only to a portion of a 
contract or subcontract, or shall not apply to performance during a 
specified period or periods, and may also provide that the contract 
price in effect during any such period or periods shall not be subject 
to renegotiation. Under subsection (i) (2) of the Statute, the Secre­
tary is authorized, in his discretion, to exempt from some or all of 
the provisions of the statute, both individually and by general classes 
or types: (i) any contract or subcontract to be performed outside 
of the territorial limits of the continental United States or in Alaska; 
(ii) any contracts or subcontracts under which, in the opinion of 
the Secretary, the profits can be determined with reasonable cer­
tainty when the contract price is established, such as certain classes of 
agreements for personal services, for the purchase of real property, 
perishable goods, or commodities the minimum price for the sale of 
which has been fixed by a public regulatory body, of leases and 
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license agreements, and of agreements where the period of per­
formance under such contract or subcontract will not be in excess of 
30 days; and (iii) a portion of any contract or subcontract or per­
formance thereunder during a specified period or periods, if in the 
opinion of the Secretary, the provisions of the contract are otherwise 
adequate to prevent excessive profits. Such contracts and subcon­
tracts remain subject to renegotiation until specifically exempted as 
provided in the statute.
(i) The Secretary of War has delegated to the Chiefs of the Supply 
Services including the Materiel Command, Army Air Forces, respec­
tively, and the Secretary of the Navy has delegated to the Under 
Secretary of the Navy, authority, in their discretion, to exempt, pur­
suant to subsection (i) (1) (ii), any contract or subcontract to be per­
formed outside of the territorial limits of the United States or in 
Alaska from some or all of the provisions of the statute. This 
authority may be exercised with respect to existing contracts and 
with respect to contracts executed in the future.
Like authority has been delegated to the Director of Procurement 
by the Secretary of the Treasury.
No contract or subcontract to be performed outside of the terri­
torial limits of the United States or in Alaska will be exempt except 
upon specific exemption individually or as a class by one of the 
Chiefs of the Supply Services, or the Commanding General, Materiel 
Command, Army Air Forces, of the War Department, the Under 
Secretary of the Navy or the Director of Procurement in the Treasury 
Department.
(ii) The Departments deem it impractical to issue jointly any 
regulations establishing exemptions of classes of contracts or sub­
contracts referred to in subsection (i) (2) of the statute because of 
variations, as between the Departments, in the circumstances under 
which those contracts and subcontracts are entered into. Pursuant 
to that subsection, exemptions may, however, from time to time 
hereafter be established by the respective Departments, applicable 
only to contracts with such Department and subcontracts thereunder. 
Such an exemption will not extend to contracts with any other 
Department or subcontracts thereunder, of the same class, unless 
specifically concurred in by the Secretary of such other Department.
J-PAB-2 (d)
2 (d) Subcontracts under exempt contracts.—The Departments in­
terpret subsections (i) (1) (i) and (i) (1) (ii) of the statute to mean 
that subcontracts under a contract or subcontract exempted by those 
subsections, are likewise exempt. This, however, does not apply to 
subcontracts under a contract or subcontract exempted by discre­
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tionary action of one of the Secretaries pursuant to subsection (i) (2) 
of the statute.
J-PAB-2 (e)
2 (e) Annual sales under $100,000.—While the statute provides 
that the renegotiation clause need be included only in contracts 
and subcontracts for amounts in excess of $100,000, nevertheless con­
tracts and subcontracts for amounts of $100,000 or less are subject to 
renegotiation unless otherwise exempted. The statute, however, is not 
applicable unless the aggregate sales by the contractor or subcontrac­
tor, and by all persons under the control of or controlling or under 
common control with the contractor or subcontactor, under contracts 
with the Departments and subcontracts thereunder do not exceed, or 
in the opinion of the Secretary concerned will not exceed, $100,000 
for the fiscal year of such contractor or subcontractor.
J-PAB-3
3. Subcontracts for real property excluded.—The term “article” is de­
fined to include any “material * * * or other personal property.” 
This definition, by inference at least, excludes real property. It fol­
lows, therefore, that a sale of real property or the construction of 
improvements thereon or of equipment to become a part thereof 
which is required to perform another contract is not included in the 
definition of the term “subcontract.” This situation must be care­
fully distinguished from the case where the sale of the real property 
or the construction of improvements thereon or equipment therefor 
is the subject matter of a prime contract with one of the Departments. 
Thus, a contract to sell, construct or equip a building for a contractor 
requiring it in order to perform a contract or a subcontract would be 
excluded; while a contract to sell, construct or equip a building 
directly for a Department (or for one acting as an agent for a Depart­
ment) would constitute a prime contract which would be subject to 
renegotiation.
J-PAB-4
4. Statutes of limitation.—The statute provides two statutes of limita­
tion, one on the renegotiation of individual contracts and the other 
on renegotiation for an expired fiscal year or years.
(a) Renegotiation of individual contracts—No renegotiation of 
the contract price pursuant to any provision therefor, or otherwise, 
shall be commenced by the Secretary more than one year after the 
close of the fiscal year of the contractor or subcontractor within which 
completion or termination of the contract or subcontract, as deter­
mined by the Secretary, occurs. (See subsection (c) (6).) The Depart­
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ments interpret this provision to mean that renegotiation commences 
on the specific date set by the Department conducting renegotiation 
for the initial renegotiation conference unless otherwise agreed by 
the contractor.
The question has arisen as to whether the term “completion * * * 
of the contract,’’ as used in this provision, means final delivery, 
acceptance or payment. The Departments have adopted the view 
that completion of the contract means final delivery or acceptance 
under the contract, rather than final payment, and the fact that a 
contractor may still have certain obligations under guarantees of 
performance or the fact that there may be unliquidated items out­
standing does not extend the time of completion beyond the date of 
final delivery or acceptance.
(b) Renegotiation for prior years.—Any contractor or subcon­
tractor may file with the Secretaries of the Departments concerned 
financial statements for any prior fiscal year or years, in such form and 
detail as the Secretaries shall prescribe by joint regulation. The 
Secretary of each such Department has one year thereafter within 
which he may give written notice of renegotiation, in form and 
manner to be prescribed in such joint regulation, fixing a date and 
place for an initial conference to be held within 60 days, and unless 
such notice is given by one of the Secretaries and renegotiation com­
menced by such Secretary within 60 days, the liability of the con­
tractor or subcontractor for excessive profits realized during such 
year or years will be discharged. (See subsection (c) (5).)
A joint regulation prescribing the form of the financial statements 
which the contractor or subcontractor may file was promulgated as 
of February 1, 1943.
J-PAB-5
5. Recognition of exclusions and deductions allowed for Federal tax 
purposes.—Under subsection (c) (3) of the statute, as amended, the 
Secretary in determining the excessiveness of profits must “recognize 
the properly applicable exclusions and deductions of the character’’ 
which the contractor or subcontractor is allowed under chapter 1 
and chapter 2 E of the Internal Revenue Code. Since those items 
must be properly applicable to the profits from the contracts and 
subcontracts being renegotiated, they must be allocated between 
the renegotiable and nonrenegotiable business, even though the full 
amount is allowed for tax purposes. The words “of the character’’ 
disclaim the implication that the renegotiating authorities are re­
quired to compute and allow the actual dollar amount of exclusions 
and deductions which the Bureau of Internal Revenue would allow.
The Departments have issued the following interpretations with 
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respect to the recognition of exclusions and deductions allowed for 
Federal tax purposes:
J-PAB-5 (a)
5 (a) Amortization, depreciation and conversion.—Under section 
124 of the Internal Revenue Code, if a contractor has acquired or 
constructed with his own funds facilities especially adapted for use 
in war production, he may amortize the cost over a 5-year period 
at the rate of 20 percent per year upon obtaining a Certificate of 
Necessity from the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy. 
Even though the contactor has obtained a Certificate of Necessity, he 
need not amortize the cost at this special rate but may, if he desires, 
amortize his cost at ordinary rates.
In computing net profits before Federal income and excess profits 
taxes of any contractor or subcontractor, for purposes of renegotia­
tion, the amount of amortization allowed under section 124 of the 
Internal Revenue Code (except to the extent of depreciation) will 
not be allowed as an item of cost. However, the amount of such 
amortization in excess of depreciation will be deducted from such 
profits and not considered as representing excessive profits for pur­
poses of renegotiation. In determining whether and the extent to 
which profits remaining after deducting the amount of such amortiza­
tion are excessive, consideration will be given to the extent that it 
appears that the contractor or subcontractor will have residual value 
in the amortized facilities so far as it may be reasonably ascertained.
If the emergency is terminated during the 5-year period, the 
amortization period may be shortened accordingly, and the con­
tractor or subcontractor will be entitled to adjust his taxes for prior 
years, on the conditions stated in the Internal Revenue Code, to give 
effect to the corresponding increase in the deduction taken in each 
such year, but there is no authority for reopening renegotiation 
agreements to give consideration to this accelerated amortization 
corresponding to the adjustment of taxes for prior years to which 
the contractor or subcontractor may thus become entitled.
War facilities not covered by Certificates of Necessity, representing 
permanent capital additions for the manufacture of war products 
or materials, are depreciated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and 
will be depreciated in renegotiation, at the ordinary rates of deprecia­
tion for corresponding property. The demands of war production, 
however, frequently require the use of facilities for extraordinary 
consecutive periods of day and night shifts, and under those circum­
stances the Bureau and the renegotiation authorities may allow 
depreciation on the machinery, but not on the buildings, at higher 
rates.
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The full amount of costs of converting facilities to war production 
which do not represent permanent additions, such as rearrangement 
of machinery, is allowed by the Bureau, and will be allowed in re­
negotiation, for the year in which it is incurred. This does not in­
clude losses on commercial inventory which has become unsaleable 
as a result of wartime regulations or loss of market.
J-PAB-5 (b)
5 (b) Losses from prior years— Section 122 of the Internal 
Revenue Code authorizes the deduction for any taxable year of the 
“net operating loss” for the first and second preceding taxable years, 
subject to certain exceptions and limitations. The part of such loss 
which was attributable to contracts or subcontracts subject to 
renegotiation is a “properly applicable” deduction which is allowed 
in renegotiation, but the part which was attributable to commercial 
business or to contracts and subcontracts not subject to renegotiation 
is not allowed. The term “net operating loss” and the amount 
thereof which is deductible for tax purposes is defined in the code. 
In determining the amount of “net operating loss” to be allowed for 
renegotiation purposes, losses on contracts and subcontracts pursuant 
to which final payment was made prior to April 28, 1942, or which 
for other reasons would not be subject to renegotiation even had 
such losses been incurred during the fiscal year or other period under 
consideration, are not allowed.
Even though a contractor has no “net operating loss” to carry over 
for tax purposes, the renegotiating authorities, nevertheless, give 
consideration, under proper circumstances, to losses incurred in prior 
years on contracts and subcontracts subject to renegotiation. This 
does not necessarily mean that the full amount of such losses are to 
be allowed against profits for the fiscal year or other period under 
consideration, but only that they may be recognized as one of the 
factors in determining whether such profits are excessive.
The Internal Revenue Code also provides for the “carry back” of 
“net operating losses” in subsequent years through adjustment of 
taxes for prior years, but there is no authority for reopening re­
negotiation agreements to give consideration to net losses incurred 
in periods subsequent to the periods covered by such agreements.
J-PAB-5 (c)
5 (c) War losses.—Section 127 of the Internal Revenue Code pro­
vides that the amount of the loss on account of property destroyed or 
seized on or after December 7, 1941, in the course of military or naval 
operations by the United States or any other country engaged in 
the present war may be allowed as a deduction from income in the 
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year in which such destruction or seizure occurs. The fact that the 
property has been destroyed or seized in the course of the war does 
not of itself establish the loss as a “properly applicable” deduction 
to be recognized in renegotiation. In order that such a loss be 
recognized in renegotiation, the contractor or subcontractor must 
furnish evidence satisfactory to the renegotiating authorities of the 
connection between the property destroyed or seized and the per­
formance of the contracts or subcontracts being renegotiated.
J-PAB-5 (d)
5 (d) Interest.—Interest on borrowed capital is deductible under 
the Internal Revenue Code and is, therefore, allowed where properly 
applicable for purposes of contract renegotiation.
The general principle used in the allocation of interest is that all 
interest on borrowed funds is allocated between sales subject to 
renegotiation and sales not subject to renegotiation on the basis of 
the proportion which each category of sales bears to the total busi­
ness, with the exception that in no case is the interest charged to 
sales subject to renegotiation less than the interest on those borrow­
ings which can be definitely ascertained as applicable to such sales 
(e. g., “V” loans, advance payments, etc.), and similarly, in no case is 
interest charged to sales not subject to renegotiation less than the 
interest on those borrowings which can be definitely ascertained as 
applicable to such sales. An appropriate portion of such interest will 
be allocated to income, if any, derived from sources other than sales.
So long as the borrowed capital is used for war purposes, it does 
not matter when the obligation was incurred. Interest on long-term 
bonds and obligations issued long before the war is allowable if the 
capital represented by such obligations is used for war production.
J-PAB-5 (e)
5 (e) Advertising.— Allowances for advertising expenses are based 
upon deductions allowed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for tax 
purposes. These allowable deductions have been described by Com­
missioner Guy T. Helvering of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in a 
statement issued on September 29, 1942, as follows:
To be deductible, advertising expenditures must be ordinary and 
necessary and bear a reasonable relation to the business activities 
in which the enterprise is engaged. The Bureau recognizes that 
advertising is a necessary and legitimate business expense so long 
as it is not carried to an unreasonable extent or does not become 
an attempt to avoid proper tax payments.
The Bureau realizes that it may be necessary for taxpayers now 
engaged in war production to maintain through advertising, their 
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trade names and the knowledge of the quality of their products 
and good will built up over past years, so that when they return to 
peacetime production their names and the quality of their prod­
ucts will be known to the public.
In determining whether such expenditures are allowable, cog­
nizance will be taken of (1) the size of the business, (2) the amount 
of prior advertising budgets, (3) the public patronage reasonably 
to be expected in the future, (4) the increased cost of the elements 
entering into the total of advertising expenditures, (5) the intro­
duction of new products and added lines, and (6) buying habits 
necessitated by war restrictions, by priorities, and by the unavail­
ability of many of the raw materials formerly fabricated into the 
advertised products.
Reasonable expenses incurred by companies in advertising and 
advertising technique to speed the war effort among their own em­
ployees, and to cut down accidents and unnecessary absences 
and inefficiency, will be allowed as deductions. Also reasonable 
expenditures for advertisements including the promotion of Gov­
ernment objectives in wartime, such as conservation, salvage or the 
sale of War Bonds, which are signed by the advertiser, will be 
deductible provided they are reasonable and are not made in an 
attempt to avoid proper taxation.
Ordinarily, product advertising specifically offering individual 
products for current sale (as distinguished from institutional adver­
tising designed to keep the advertiser’s name or the names of its 
peacetime products before the public) is charged in full to com­
mercial business, but product advertising by subcontractors may be 
allowed in a reasonable amount as a charge against renegotiable 
business with respect to products sold primarily for use in war pro­
duction.
The test of whether expenditures for advertising are reasonable is 
whether they are ordinary and necessary and bear a reasonable rela­
tion to the business activities in which the enterprise is engaged. In 
making this test of reasonableness, consideration is given to the 
amount spent for institutional advertising, and for product advertis­
ing of the nature of institutional advertising. If such expenditures 
are extravagant and out of proportion to the size of the company 
or to the amount of its advertising budget in the past, such payments 
will be disallowed as elements of cost.
J-PAB-5 (f)
5 (f) Salaries, wages, and other compensation.—Subsection (d) of 
section 403 provides that “in renegotiating a contract price or de­
termining excessive profits * * * the Secretaries of the respective De­
partments shall not make any allowance for any salaries, bonuses 
25
or other compensation paid by a contractor to its officers or em­
ployees in excess of a reasonable amount.” Pursuant to such provi­
sion consideration is given to the nature of the work, extent of 
responsibility and experience and effectiveness of the officer or 
employee, and increases in compensation since January 1, 1939; and 
comparison is made where possible with the compensation of officers 
or employees in similar positions in other companies within the 
particular industry. Reasonableness of compensation is determined 
only within broad limits, and weight is given to the determination 
by the company of the value to it of the services of an officer or 
employee.
Any statutory provision, and any Executive orders or regulations 
and salaries issued under the Act of Congress approved October 2, 
1942, regulating or limiting the payment of wages and salaries will 
be observed in renegotiation so far as applicable.
J-PAB-6
6. Costs of post-war conversion.—Contractors frequently create re­
serves for the purpose of reconverting their plant facilities to normal 
peacetime operations at the termination of the war. It is the policy 
of the Departments to disallow any such charges for the reasons that 
(i) the necessity for the reconversion may never arise; (ii) the nature, 
extent and cost of reconversion is too conjectural to warrant a 
present determination with respect thereto; and (iii) the unknown 
duration of the war precludes an estimate with any degree of accuracy 
of the amount of money which may be required for reconversion. 
This is in accordance with the policy stated by Mr. Donald M. Nel­
son, Chairman of the War Production Board, in a letter dated 
March 6, 1942, addressed to the Under Secretaries of the War and 
Navy Departments.
J-PAB-7
7. Patent royalties.—Public Law 768, 77th Congress, approved Octo­
ber 31, 1942, provides that whenever an invention, patented or un­
patented, is manufactured for the United States, with license from 
the owner, and such license provides for the payment of royalties 
at rates or amounts ‘‘believed to be unreasonable or excessive by the 
head of the department or agency of the Government which has 
ordered such manufacture”, the head of the Department concerned 
shall notify the licensor and the licensee and within a reasonable 
time thereafter shall ‘‘fix and specify such rates or amounts of 
royalties, if any, as he shall determine are fair and just, taking into 
account the conditions of wartime production” and shall authorize 
the payment thereof by the licensee to the licensor. It further pro­
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vides that the licensee shall not thereafter pay to the licensor nor 
charge to the United States a royalty in excess of that specified in 
the order and that the licensor’s sole and exclusive remedy for royal­
ties in excess thereof shall be by suit in the Court of Claims or in the 
district courts having concurrent jurisdiction. The statute further 
provides that:
Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to preclude the ap­
plicability of Public Law 528, 77th Congress [i.e., section 403], 
as the same may be heretofore or hereafter amended so far as the 
same may be applicable.
As part of the renegotiation with any contractor or subcontractor 
who has included in costs substantial amounts for royalties paid or 
payable under patent licenses, inquiry will be made as to any action 
taken, pending or contemplated under the statute, and no allowance 
will be made for royalties in excess of any rate or amount fixed and 
specified by the head of the department or agency of the Govern­
ment which has ordered manufacture thereunder.
In the absence of an order under the royalty statute, the renego­
tiation authorities will consider whether or not the amount of the 
royalties is fair and reasonable under the circumstances (taking into 
consideration the affiliation, if any, of the licensor and licensee).
J-PAB-8
8. Contracts with manufacturers’ representatives.—Contracts between 
manufacturers and their representatives are subject to renegotiation 
as subcontracts when the representative is performing, or agrees to 
make available on request, engineering, mechanical, or other services 
related to the performance of one or more prime contracts with one 
of the Departments or subcontracts thereunder, including assistance 
in the obtaining of priority certificates and in other matters required 
in connection with performance of the contract. For example, manu­
facturers’ agents in the machine tool industry customarily hold them­
selves ready to furnish engineering advice, mechanical service, and 
advice on training in the use of tools irrespective of whether they 
are availed of by the manufacturer, and by contract or custom the 
commissions of the agent are usually paid in either case and charged 
by the manufacturer into the cost of the tool. These activities com­
prise “part of the work required for the performance of another 
contract” within the definition of subcontact in the renegotiation 
statute. When a manufacturer’s representative also acts as dealer 
he is in substantially the same position as a jobber and his sales of 
articles to one of the Departments or a contractor with a Depart­
ment or a subcontractor thereunder are subject to renegotiation 
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whether the articles are delivered from his own inventory or shipped 
direct by the manufacturer. The fact that the prices on articles 
handled by manufacturers’ representatives and jobbers are regu­
lated under Office of Price Administration price ceilings does not 
affect the result. The reasonableness of such charges determines the 
extent to which they will be allowed as costs of the contractor for 
the purpose of renegotiation.
J-PAB-9
9. Over-all renegotiation; Cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts.—Renegotiation 
on the basis of the over-all profit on the war contracts of a contractor 
or subcontractor for a specified period was not expressly authorized 
by the original statute and was adopted by the Departments as a 
matter of policy. This method is now authorized by the statute, as 
amended, which expressly provides for renegotiation of contracts 
and subcontracts as a group without separately renegotiating the 
contract price of each contract or subcontract. The statute also con­
tains, however, the original provision for renegotiation by individual 
contracts, and in some instances the Secretaries have found that 
method more convenient in actual practice. Under renegotiation on 
an over-all basis, excessive profits are determined by a study of a 
contractor’s financial position and the profits, past and prospective, 
from his contracts and subcontracts taken as a whole for a particular 
fiscal year or other period rather than by analyzing each individual 
contract or subcontract on a unit cost basis.
Only contracts with the Departments named in the statute and 
subcontracts thereunder are subject to renegotiation and accord­
ingly sales and costs are segregated between them and other contracts 
and business. War contracts not subject to renegotiation ordinarily 
will be renegotiated if the contractor or subcontractor so requests, 
provided their inclusion does not reduce the profits on the renegoti­
able business, but under no circumstances will commercial or civilian 
business be included in the renegotiation.
In renegotiation on an over-all profit basis, fees under cost-plus- 
fixed-fee contracts will be renegotiated separately from the fixed-price 
contracts of the contractor.
J-PAB-10
10. Credit for Federal taxes; State and local taxes.—Before the amend­
ment to the statute, concern had been frequently expressed that a 
contractor might be required to pay taxes on his profits and then be 
required at a later date to refund these profits as a result of renego­
tiation. The statute originally made no express provision for crediting 
against excessive profits eliminated through renegotiation Federal 
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income and excess profits taxes assessed with respect thereto. In the 
absence of such credit the contractor would be forced to pay twice, 
once in the form of taxes and the second time by a refund of 
excessive profits. While it seemed plain that the original statute did 
not intend such double liability, section 403 was amended to provide 
that in determining the amount of excessive profits the Secretary 
shall allow the contractor or subcontractor credit for the amount of 
the Federal income and excess profits taxes paid or payable with 
respect to such excessive profits, as provided in section 3806 of the 
Internal Revenue Code.
Under section 3806 of the code, in case of renegotiation with re­
spect to years for which Federal income and excess profits returns 
have not been filed, the amount of excessive profits eliminated may 
be excluded from gross income in such returns, provided at the time 
of filing the return the renegotiation has progressed to such a stage 
that the amount of excessive profits eliminated has become certain. 
This procedure has been specifically authorized by I. T. 3577 (In­
ternational Revenue Bulletin 1942 No. 37), and is subject to the con­
dition that a tax may be assessed on any portion of the excessive 
profits which is not eliminated by renegotiation.
State and local taxes are recognized as a proper item of expense, 
subject, of course, to allocation between renegotiable and nonre­
negotiable business.
J-PAB-11
11. Final agreements and clearance.—When a contractor or subcon­
tractor has renegotiated in good faith for a specified period and 
agreed to eliminate excessive profits for such period, he is entitled 
to assurance that the matter will not be reopened at a later date. 
The original statute did not expressly provide for any final clearance 
from liability for excessive profits, but under the statute as amended, 
the Secretaries are expressly authorized to make agreements and “any 
such agreement shall be final and conclusive according to its terms; 
and, except upon a showing of fraud or malfeasance or a wilful mis­
representation of a material fact, such agreement shall not be 
reopened as to the matter agreed upon, and shall not be modified by 
any officer, employee, or agent of the United States.” The Secretary 
of each Department has delegated to the Secretary of each other 
Department the power to sign final and other agreements on his 
behalf, with respect to renegotiations assigned to such other Depart­
ment. Thus, if a case for renegotiation is assigned to the Secretary 
of one Department for renegotiation, the Secretary of that Depart­
ment has the power to sign a final agreement on behalf of the Secre­
taries of the other Departments.
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J-PAB-12
12. Responsibility of contractors to withhold payments of excessive 
profits to subcontractors.—Under the terms of the statute, as originally 
adopted, concern was expressed by many contractors in regard to 
their liability to withhold excessive profits made by their subcon­
tractors. Under the statute as amended, the contractor is under no 
obligation to withhold payments to a subcontractor unless there 
has been a determination by the Government of the existence of 
excessive profits. In other words, the contractor should make pay­
ment to the subcontractor in accordance with the terms of the sub­
contract until such time as a determination of excessive profits under 
the subcontract has been made and the contractor has been directed 
to withhold payments to the subcontractor. If at such time there are 
further payments due, the contractor should retain the amount 
specified in such direction. If all payments have been made to the 
subcontractor prior to the time when the contractor receives notice 
of a direction for withholding such excessive profits, the contractor 
has no responsibility or obligation in the matter of withholding pay­
ments under such subcontract. Conversely, a subcontractor is liable 
to the Government only for the repayment of amounts representative 
of excessive profits actually paid to him by a contractor and not for 
those eliminated through reductions in contract prices or otherwise.
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